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ARGUMENT 
Ford Motor Company's conditional cross appeal raises two separate, but related, 
issues: (i) whether there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that 
plaintiff Kellie Montoya first learned of her claims against Ford more than 17 months 
after she filed her complaint; and (ii) whether the trial court should have dismissed 
Ms. Montoya's claims as barred by Utah's 2-year product liability statute of limitations. 
In Ford's opening brief on its cross appeal, Ford first argued that a reasonable 
juror could not have concluded that Ms. Montoya learned of her claims against Ford 
during her deposition in this case, which is the only event that occurred on the date found 
by the jury. (Ford Br. at 56.) Ford then argued that the trial court should have dismissed 
Ms. Montoya's claims as a matter of law because Utah's discovery rule does not excuse 
her failure to file within the statute of limitations period. The discovery rule does not 
apply because (i) well before the statute of limitations had run, Ms. Montoya retained 
counsel to represent her with respect to "claims against all parties arising out of injuries 
which occurred" as a result of the accident at issue in this case; but (ii) well after the 
statute of limitations had run, she filed her complaint against Ford. (Ford Br. at 57-60.) 
In response, Ms. Montoya asserts that the court should deny Ford's cross appeal 
out of hand—and indeed, award attorney fees against Ford—because Ford (i) failed to 
marshal evidence and (ii) failed to list the summary judgment order in its notice of cross 
appeal. (Montoya Br. at 41.) Both arguments misconstrue Utah law, and therefore, 
provide no basis to deny the conditional relief Ford seeks. 
1 
L Ford Need Only Marshal Evidence in Support of the Jury's Finding, Not in 
Support of Ford's Version of Events 
In response to Ford's first issue challenging the jury's finding, Ms. Montoya 
argues that Ford has failed to marshal the evidence that supports Ford's "version of the 
facts," most particularly, "any evidence when [Ms. Montoya's] lawsuit was filed in her 
behalf by her attorneys." (Montoya Br. at 35 & n.35.) Ms. Montoya's response 
misunderstands Utah's marshaling requirement, which requires Ford to marshal all the 
evidence in support of the jury's verdict, not in support of Ford's version of the facts.1 
State v. Pritchett 2003 UT 24, |25, 69 P.3d 1278 (the "burden on appeal against the jury 
verdict is to 'first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding'") 
(quoting Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9)) (emphasis added). 
The jury finding Ford challenges is that "the date upon which Kellie Montoya 
knew, or through reasonable diligence should have discovered, both her harm and its 
cause [was] October 25, 2003." (R. 10610.) The only event that occurred on October 25, 
2003, was Ms. Montoya's deposition in this case, which took place more than 17 months 
after she filed her May 14, 2002 complaint against Ford.2 (R. 2642, 2734, 11478 at 41-
44.) There is no other evidence to marshal in favor of the jury's finding, and 
1
 In addition, this court, like the trial court, can take judicial notice of when Ms. Montoya 
filed her complaint; testimony is not required to introduce such evidence into the record. 
Green River Canal Co. v. Thavn, 2003 UT 50, ^30 n.8, 84 P.3d 1134 (courts can take 
judicial notice of public records). 
2
 Kellie Montoya filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint in this lawsuit on 
January 23, 2002, even though she was not a party to this lawsuit. (R. 108.) On the same 
day, without leave, she also filed an amended complaint. (R. 120.) On April 29, 2002, 
the trial court denied Ms. Montoya's motion for leave to file an amended complaint. (R. 
209.) This ruling has not been appealed. Therefore, the date of filing for statute of 
limitations purposes is May 14,2002, not January 23, 2002, although the earlier January 
date also falls well outside the 2-year statute of limitations. 
2 
Ms. Montoya has identified none. Therefore, if the court reverses the jury's verdict and 
orders a new trial on any of the grounds identified in the opening brief, the court should 
also vacate the jury's finding that Ms. Montoya first learned about her claim against Ford 
more than a year after she filed her complaint against Ford. 
II. A Notice of Appeal Need Not List Each Intermediate Order 
In response to Ford's second issue that the trial court should have dismissed 
Ms. Montoya's claim as a matter of law because it was filed well outside the statute of 
limitations period, Ms. Montoya asserts that "Ford did not appeal the trial court's denial 
of its partial summary judgment motion." (Montoya Br. at 37.) Although Ms. Montoya 
offers no analysis or authority to support this assertion, she appears to be arguing that 
because Ford did not list in its notice of cross appeal the order denying of its summary 
judgment motion, Ford cannot appeal this order. (Id. at 41.) This is incorrect. 
While rule 3(d) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires appellants to 
"designate the judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed from," Utah appellate courts 
have repeatedly held that this rule requires an appellant only to identify the final 
judgment, and "does not require that an appellant indicate that the appeal also concerns 
intermediate orders or events that have led to that final judgment." Speros v. Fricke, 
2004 UT 69, [^16, 98 P.3d 28 (Utah 2004) (emphasis added); see also Young v. Fire Ins. 
Exchu, 2008 UT App 114,1J21 n.4, 182 P.3d 91 l(same). The denial of summary 
judgment is an intermediate order. Id. Ford's notice of appeal is not deficient. 
3
 Ms. Montoya has not alleged any prejudice stemming from Ford's notice of appeal and 
does not otherwise question the court's ability to review the summary judgment order. 
3 
Ms. Montoya's only other argument is that she could not have known that there 
was a causal relationship between the Ford Explorer and her injuries from the rollover 
accident "until NHTSA (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration) and the states 
attorney generals began their investigations into the safety of the Ford Explorer." 
(Montoya Br. at 38.) Again, Ms. Montoya simply asserts this without explanation or 
support. Tellingly, there is no evidence that Ms. Montoya ever learned of such 
investigations, only Fred Clayton—the driver's father—claims to have learned about 
them. And it is unclear how Mr. Clayton's learning about an investigation could have led 
Ms. Montoya to learn that her injuries from the rollover accident may have been caused 
by the vehicle involved in the accident, especially since Ms. Montoya elsewhere claims 
that she never "spoke with [Mr. Clayton] about the Ford Explorer lawsuit." (Montoya 
Br. at 38.) Ms. Montoya's NHTSA assertion is a red herring. 
Otherwise, Ms. Montoya simply asserts that she had no knowledge, or reason to 
know, that the "product had a causal relation to her injury." (Montoya Br. at 37.) This 
assertion rests upon a false premise: that Ms. Montoya had to learn every last detail of 
her claims against Ford before she had any obligation to file a complaint. Utah law is to 
the contrary. It is well-settled that a plaintiff need only be "on notice to make further 
inquiry." United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co., 870 P.2d 880, 889 (Utah 
1993). Moreover, "mere ignorance of the existence of a cause of action does not prevent 
the running of the statute of limitations." O'Neal v. Division of Family Servs., 821 P.2d 
1139,1143 (Utah 1991). As a Michigan court explained, "[i]t would be an extremely 
dangerous rule of law that the accrual date of a cause of action is held in abeyance 
indefinitely until a prospective plaintiff obtains professional assistance to determine the 
4 
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5 
its cause. Jepson v. State of Utah, 846 P.2d 485, 488 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). The accident 
occurred on November 27, 1998, and Mr. Montoya did not file her complaint until May 
14, 2002, nearly 18 months after the 2-year statute of limitations ran. (R. 314; 442.) 
Ms. Montoya never explains what unusual circumstances prevented her from 
learning that the vehicle may have contributed to her injuries, especially in light of her 
repeated assertion in her opening brief—something Ford denies—that the propensity of 
the Explorer to roll over was well-known for decades. (AOB at 32-42.) At the very least, 
Mr. Barton was "on notice to make further inquiry" about whether the vehicle involved in 
her accident may have contributed to her injuries.6 Park City Mines., 870 P.2d at 889. If 
Mr. Barton failed to file a claim before the statute of limitations ran, Ms. Montoya can 
-i 
look to him for her recovery. Her claims against Ford, however, are time-barred. 
Because Ms. Montoya did not file her complaint against Ford for nearly 4 years 
after the accident, and more than 2 years after retaining Mr. Barton, her claims are barred 
by the statute of limitations. The discovery rule does not apply, something this court can 
determine as a matter of law. Spears v. Warn 2002 UT 24, ^|32, 44 P.3d 742. 
CONCLUSION 
The court should affirm the jury verdict. However, if the court grants a new trial 
on any of the grounds outlined in the opening brief, the court also should (i) vacate the 
jury's finding that Ms. Montoya first learned of her claims against Ford 17 months after 
6
 Pyramid Controls, Inc. v. Siemens Indus. Automation, Inc., 172 F.3d 512, 517 (7th Cir. 
1999) (the statute of limitations is triggered ccwhen the plaintiff presents facts reasonably 
indicating a claim to his or her attorney," even if that attorney decides not to file a claim). 
7
 Hazel v. General Motors Corp., 863 F. Supp. 435, 438 n.8 (W.D. Ky. 1994) (holding 
that where a consumer knew that a fuel-fed fire caused his injuries, he undoubtedly could 
have learned about the more precise mechanism or defect had he consulted an attorney). 
6 
she filed her claims against l-V-iV . ; r • t h r t r i a l ••>!? ! • * {• u * A 
ms because they were filed well outside the 2-year statute oi hnutations period and 
fee request, as it is premised upon a misunderstanding of the marshaling requirement and 
wl mt I Itah law requires in a nonce oi appeal. 
RESPECFULLY SUMITI ED this 25th day of August ?( )08. 
SNELL & WlLMER 1 I V 
Troy L. 
Attorney for Ford Motor Company 
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